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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VAUGHN RASMUSSEN,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation,
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, a
New York corporation, and
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a
Maryland joint venture, dba
Crossroads Plaza Associates,
Defendants/Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 20512
and
No. 20755

)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Respondent Deseret Federal is involved in only one
basic issue on appeal.

The issue presented to this Court for

review, as to Deseret Federal, is whether the District Court
properly found that the statute of frauds precludes the
enforcement of an alleged oral agreement between Rasmussen and
Deseret Federal.

That issue involves consideration of the

following:
1.

Is the doctrine of promissory estoppel available

under these facts to defeat the statute of frauds?
2.

Are there sufficient memoranda of the alleged oral

agreement with Deseret Federal to remove the agreement from the
statute of frauds?
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3.

Are there any acts of part performance to justify

the enforcement of the alleged oral agreement between Rasmussen
and Deseret Federal?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
As the district court recognized, the Utah statute of
frauds is dispositive of Rasmussen1s claims against Deseret
Federal.

The applicable provisions state:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one
yearf nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner
relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assignedr surrendered or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of lawf or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1984).
Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be
void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed
by the party by whom the lease or sale is to
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
16. § 25-5-3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought by appellant Rasmussen against
Deseret Federal and Crossroads alleging breach of an oral
agreement to lease a portion of the space occupied by Deseret
Federal at the Crossroads Plaza Mall in Salt Lake City.

District

Judge Sawaya ruled that the alleged oral agreement was void under
the statute of frauds.

Appeal No. 20512 seeks a reversal of a
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summary judgment entered in favor of Deseret Federal on December
10, 1984.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Deseret Federal disagrees with Rasmussen's Statement of
Facts in many respects.

Further, many of the facts asserted

pertain only to a dispute between Rasmussen and Crossroads.
Consequently, Deseret Federal submits the following statement of
facts that were not controverted by Rasmussen.

Because this

appeal requires the Court to review a summary judgment, the facts
are stated in a light most favorable to Rasmussen.
In 1981, Rasmussen approached Deseret Federal with the
desire to lease or sublet a portion of the space Deseret Federal
was then leasing from Crossroads on the main mall level of the
Crossroads Plaza shopping center in Salt Lake City, Utah.

R.

175 (Rasmussen Depo. 59). Discussions ensued and continued for a
substantial period of time.

Deseret Federal, principally through

Howard Swapp, a Vice President of Deseret Federal, discussed with
Rasmussen the possibility of an arrangement whereby Deseret
Federal would be released by Crossroads of the subject space and
all attendant responsibilities, allowing Rasmussen to lease the
space directly from Crossroads.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 60).

Rasmussen contemplated a lease of approximately 10
years but there were also discussions of a 12 year lease.
(Rasmussen Depo. 69-70).

Additionally, Deseret Federal and

Rasmussen discussed that the space involved would include
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R. 175

releasing 790 square feet or possibly 950 square feet.

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. 22-23).
In a letter dated July 6, 1982, Rasmussen reiterated
his desire to lease a portion of the space then occupied by
Deseret Federal.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 58; Exhibit 28). At

all pertinent times, Rasmussen understood that a written release
of Deseret Federal's leasehold interest in the subject space was
a condition to any agreement between Deseret Federal and
Rasmussen.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 22-23).

Further, Rasmussen

fully understood that a written lease between Crossroads and
Rasmussen was a condition to any agreement between Deseret
Federal and Rasmussen.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 25-26).

On January 13, 1983f Howard Swappf on behalf of Deseret
Federal, wrote a letter to Kravco, Inc. ("Kravco") , Crossroads'
leasing agent, authorizing Kravco to act as Deseret Federal's
agent in the negotiations to release Deseret Federal from its
obligations with respect to the subject space and to re-let such
space to Rasmussen.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo., Exhibit 2). A copy

of that letter is attached hereto as Addendum 1 for the
convenience of the court.

The January 13 letter states, "for

several months Deseret Federal Savings and Vaughn Rasmussen have
been negotiating a proposal that Deseret Federal would vacate and
Vaughn Rasmussen would occupy approximately 950 square feet of
our space on the main plaza level."
Exhibit 2) (emphasis added).

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo.,

The letter further states that the
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following conditions would apply to any arrangement among Deseret
Federal, Crossroads, and Rasmussen:
(1)

The subject space was available only to Rasmussen;

(2)

Deseret Federal would be unconditionally released

from all tenant responsibility for the space;
(3)

Deseret Federal was not to pay any fees, charges,

etc., relative to the transaction; and
(4)

Deseret Federal and Rasmussen were to fully

execute additional agreements.
Id.

Further, the January 13 authorization letter also stated

that Kravco's authority to act as agent in the negotiations with
Rasmussen would expire on March 15, 1983.

R. 175 (Rasmussen

Depo. 3, Exhibit 2). At his deposition in this case, Rasmussen
acknowledged that the terms of the January 13 letter from Deseret
Federal to Kravco were fully consistent with the terms discussed
in negotiations between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen.

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. 76).
On March 9, 1983, Bruce Barcal sent a letter to Deseret
Federal stating that it was Crossroads1 "intent" to release
Deseret Federal from its obligations with respect to the subject
space.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo., Exhibit 4). A copy of that

letter is attached hereto as Addendum 2.

The letter further

states that formal documents would be sent for execution by the
parties.

Such documents, however, were not provided to Deseret

Federal prior to the March 15, 1983 deadline.
Affidavit).

R. 129 (Swapp

On April 13, 1983, long after the deadline,
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Crossroads delivered a proposed lease agreement to Rasmussen.
159.

R.

However, no agreements were executed concerning the subject

space between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen before the March 15
deadline or at any time thereafter.

R. 129 (Swapp Affidavit).

Following the March 15f 1983 deadline when Kravco's
authority to act as Deseret Federal's agent expiredf Rasmussen
and Deseret Federal discussed details of a possible sublease
whereby Deseret Federal would directly sublease the subject space
to Rasmussen.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 69-70).

Deseret Federal

indicated to Rasmussen they would consider subletting the subject
space instead of completely releasing the space.

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. 51, Exhibit 12). The proposed sublease
contemplated a period of 12 years with rent "somewhere in the
neighborhood" of $25.00 a foot.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 66-67).

Any agreement to sublease was conditioned upon, among other
things, the consent of Crossroads.

Indeed, Rasmussen understood

that no sublease arrangement was possible unless Deseret Federal
and Rasmussen obtained Crossroads1 consent to such an
arrangement.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 68-69).

Rasmussen

requested the consent of Crossroads for the sublease but such
consent was denied.
22).

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 3, 58, Exhibits 6,

No written agreement for a sublease of the subject space

was ever executed between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen.

R. 129

(Swapp Affidavit).
Rasmussen asserts that he spent a great deal of money
to obtain a loan from the small business administration in
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connection with the subject spacef to prepare construction plans
for the subject space and for space that Deseret Federal was to
occupy in lieu of the subject space, and to purchase inventory
for the new store.

However, Rasmussen never took possession of

the subject space, paid any rents to Deseret Federal or
Crossroads for the subject space, made any repairs or
improvements to the premises, or purchased and installed any
fixtures.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court properly concluded that, as a matter
of law, any alleged oral agreement between Rasmussen and Deseret
Federal is void under the statute of frauds.

Rasmussen argues

that there are factual issues concerning the operation of the
statute of frauds.

Specifically, Rasmussen contends that factual

issues exist with respect to (1) whether the statute of frauds
should not be applied under the doctrine of r ; D >issory estoppel,
(2) whether there are sufficient memoranda of the alleged oral
agreement, or (3) whether Rasmussen's conduct constitutes part
performance.

Each of those arguments must be rejected.

Promissory estoppel was not raised in the district
court and may not be raised for the first time in this appeal.
Moreover, under Utah law the acts and conduct of the promissor
must clearly manifest an intention not to assert the statute of
frauds that to permit him to do so would work a fraud on the
other party.
intention.

The undisputed facts do not even hint at such an
Further, this Court has recognized that written
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memoranda must expressly or impliedly acknowledge or recognize
that a contract has been entered into to satisfy the statute of
frauds.

To the contrary, the writings relied upon by Rasmussen

refer to the alleged agreement as a "proposal" in the process of
negotiation.
Finally, the acts of past performance relied upon by
Rasmussen are simply insufficient to establish the alleged
agreement.

Rasmussen did not take possession of the subject

space, make any valuable improvements, or pay any consideration
to Deseret Federal.

The district court properly entered summary

judgment in favor of Deseret Federal and that ruling should be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
Appellant Rasmussen seeks to enforce an alleged oral
agreement between Rasmussen and Deseret Federal that Deseret
Federal would surrender its leasehold interest in a portion of
its space and would consent to a lease of that space by
Crossroads to Rasmussen.

This alleged oral contract is squarely

within the first section of the Utah Statute of Frauds which
provides:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one
year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner
relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
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Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1984) (emphasis added).

The alleged

agreement also comes within the language of Section 3 of the Utah
Statute of Frauds.

See Id. § 25-5-3.

Rasmussen concedes that the alleged oral agreement
comes within the statute of frauds but asserts that the statute
should not be enforced in this case.

As the district court

properly concluded, however, the exceptions to the statute urged
by Rasmussen are unavailable as a matter of law.

I.

THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Rasmussen first contends that there are factual issues

concerning the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

A review of the

record in this matter does not reveal that this theory was before
the trial court at any time prior to entry of summary judgment in
favor of Deseret Federal.
consider this issue.

This Court should therefore refuse to

See, e.g. , Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d

553, 557 (Utah 1984) ("Where an issue is not raised in the trial
court, this court will not consider it on appeal."); Franklin
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044
(Utah 1983).
In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
unavailable under the facts in this case.

Promissory estoppel

historically has been used as a substitute for consideration but
has been extended by most courts, including this Court, to act as
a bar to a statute of frauds defense.
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See Ravarino v. Price, 123

Utah 559f 260 P.2d 570 (1953).

This Court, however, has

recognized a very limited application of the doctrine.
In

McKinnon v. Corporation of the President of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah
1974), this Court reaffirmed a limited application of the
promissory estoppel doctrine recognized in an earlier case:
[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel [was]
extended, in a limited form, to those cases
concerned with . . . the Statute of Frauds
where the promise as to future conduct
constituted the intended abandonment of an
existing right of the promissor. However, a
mere promise to execute a written contract
and a subsequent refusal to do so is
insufficient to create an estoppel, although
reliance is placed on such a promise and
damage is sustained as a consequence of the
refusal. The acts and conduct of the
promissor must so clearly manifest an
intention that he will not assert the statute
that to permit him to do so would be to work
a fraud on the other party.
Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added).

The limitations recognized in

McKinnon are essential to prevent the statute of frauds from
becoming meaningless.
P.2d 332 (1956).

See Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295

Consequently, under Utah law the party

attempting to assert promissory estoppel to enforce an oral
promise must prove:

(1) a promise, (2) which the promissor

should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance on the
part of the promissee, (3) which does induce the action or
forebearance, (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise, (5) the promise as to future conduct constituted the
intended abandonment of an existing right of the promissor, and
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(6) the acts and conduct of the promissor must so clearly
manifest an intention that he will not assert the statute that to
permit him to do so would be to work a fraud on the other party.
Id.; Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 575; see also Restatement (Second) Of
Contracts § 139 (1981); 3 S. Williston & w. Jaeger, The Law of
Contracts § 533A (1960).

In this casef the undisputed facts

demonstrate that these requirements have not been satisfied.
A.

The Undisputed Facts Demonstrate that Deseret
Federal Made No Unconditional Promise.
There is no evidence that Deseret Federal

unconditionally promised to surrender its leasehold interest in
the subject space to Rasmussen.

Indeedf the undisputed evidence

in the record indicates that several conditions existed to any
promise by Deseret Federal to Rasmussen, that Rasmussen fully
understood such conditions, and that the conditions were not
satisfied.
In the letter of January 13, 1983, relied upon by
Rasmussen, Deseret Federal refers to the alleged oral agreement
as a l!proposal" that the parties had been "negotiating."

The

letter then sets forth the specific conditions required by
Deseret Federal to be met prior to releasing its leasehold
interest in the subject space.

Those conditions were:

(1) that

Deseret Federal be unconditionally released from any
responsibility for the subject space by Crossroads, (2) that
Deseret Federal not be required to pay any fees, charges, or
commissions in connection with the transaction, and (3) that
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Deseret Federal and Rasmussen fully execute the relevant
agreements.

Rasmussen testified that he understood that a

written lease between Crossroads and Rasmussen was a condition to
any agreement between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen for release
of the subject space.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 25-26, 74-75).

Similarly, Rasmussen understood that no sublease arrangement was
possible between himself and Deseret Federal unless he obtained
Crossroads1 consent to the sublease.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo.

68-69) .
A binding contract cannot exist when the agreement
depends on the satisfaction of conditions precedent which
admittedly have not been satisfied.

Seef e.g.f Clayton v.

Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982).

For

example, in Welch Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d
73 (Utah 1983), the parties agreed to exchange certain real
property conditioned upon obtaining a release from third parties
with interests in the land.

A release was not obtained and the

Court held the contract invalid.
stated:

In so holding, the Court

"Where fulfillment of a contract is made to depend upon

the act or consent of a third person over whom neither party has
any control, the contract cannot be enforced unless the act is
performed or the consent given."

JEd. at 76.

The facts here are indistinguishable from those in
Welch Transfer.

Rasmussen has admitted that any agreement with

Deseret Federal was conditioned upon an unconditional and
complete release of Deseret Federal by Crossroads, a written
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lease between Crossroads and Rasmussen, and the execution of
final agreements.

Because these conditions have not been

satisfied, there simply is no enforceable promise, which is an
essential requirement of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
B.

Deseret Federal Always Maintained its Right to Rely
Upon the Protection of the Statute of Frauds.
No promise of Deseret Federal as to future

conduct constituted the intended abandonment of an existing
right.

Deseret Federal had the right to require a final written

agreement between itself and Rasmussen and to require a written
release from Crossroads prior to consummation of the transaction.
There is no evidence in the record that Deseret Federal ever
abandoned its right to assert the statute of frauds or held such
an intention.

Indeed, Deseret Federal retained and exercised its

full and complete right to assert the statute of frauds. The
conditions stated in the January 13 letter plainly indicate that
Deseret Federal required a written release from Crossroads and
that Deseret Federal and Rasmussen fully execute final agreements
before consummation of the transaction.
The acts and conduct of Deseret Federal do not manifest
an intention that it would not assert the statute.

Rasmussen

contends that Bruce Barcal (presumably acting as agent for
Crossroads and Deseret Federal) encouraged Rasmussen to take
action in reliance on the existence of a lease.

Rasmussen claims

that Barcal assured Rasmussen that it was alright to proceed with
financing, remodeling plans, and purchase of inventory because
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documents were being prepared.

Further, Rasmussen contends that

Barcal specified a weekend when final lease documents were to
have been delivered.

Such conduct, howeverf is insufficient as a

matter of law under the standard set forth by this Court to
justify avoidance of the statute of frauds.
As set forth in Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386f 295
P.2d 332, 334 (1956) :
In most instances of negotiations for
transactions included within the statute a
reduction of the contract to writing is
contemplated, and, in all probability, the
parties will discuss who will draw the
instrument and when and where it will be
signed. The mere refusal to execute a
written contract as agreed does not
constitute "Fraud" within the rule that the
Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where
the effect would be to perpetrate a fraud,
. . . and to hold otherwise would, in effect,
completely nullify the Statute of Frauds.
This case comes within the analysis of this Court in
Easton.

The parties contemplated a reduction of their proposed

agreement to writing and discussed who would draft the agreement.
As was its right, however, Deseret Federal refused to proceed
with the transaction when the documents did not arrive within the
period set forth in the January 13, 1983 letter to Bruce Barcal.
Such a refusal cannot be construed to constitute the perpetration
of a fraud.

To the contrary, the acts and conduct of Deseret

Federal in setting a condition that final written documents be
required before finalization of the proposed agreement and in
ultimately requiring Crossroads to prepare final agreements for
the signature of all parties suggests an intent to assert the
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full protection of the statute of frauds.

The testimony of

Rasmussen indicates a complete awareness that none of the parties
would be bound to the proposed agreement in the absence of final
written documents.
The cases cited by Rasmussen in support of his argument
that promissory estoppel should be applied in this case do not
apply the standard required by Utah law and in fact support the
position of Deseret Federal.

Indeed, Rasmussen1s brief

conspicuously lacks any Utah cases that are supportive of his
argument.
Rasmussen first relies upon Mauala v. Millford
Management Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

The

standard applied in that case is similar to the Utah standard in
that the court required a "fraudulent oral promise."

Howeverf

t^e Mauala court found that sufficient evidence of fraud existed
in that case for the matter to go to a jury.

In Maula, the

parties had an oral agreement for the lease of an apartment and
in fact a written agreement was signed by the plaintiff and sent
to the defendant but never returned.

The plaintiff entered into

possession, painted the apartment in accordance with the color
specifications set by the defendant, and was merely waiting to
move into the apartment.

In fact, the defendant had received a

substantial benefit and gave no indication that it intended to
rely upon the statute of frauds.

By contrast, there is no

evidence of fraud in the instant case.

Deseret Federal has

always taken the position that there would be no agreement until

-15-

the final written documents were signed.
aware of that condition.

Rasmussen was fully

Moreover, there is no evidence here

that Deseret Federal received any benefit from Rasmussen1s
alleged actions taken in reliance on the oral agreement which
would support an inference of fraud as in Mauala.
The second case relied upon by Rasmussen, Lacy v.
Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781 (1940), is also
inapplicable.

The Lacy court applied a standard much different

from the standard established by the Utah cases.

In addition,

the only issue before the court was whether the party against
whom the promise is sought to be enforced must receive some
benefit or consideration.
The facts in this case indicate that Deseret Federal
never made an unconditional promise to release the subject space
to Rasmussen.

Any agreement was conditioned upon Crossroads'

approval and the execution of final lease documents.

Deseret

Federal never manifested any intention that it would not assert
the statute of frauds and to permit it to do so does not work a
fraud upon Rasmussen.

Promissory estoppel is therefore

unavailable as a matter of law.

II.

THERE ARE NO MEMORANDA OF ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN RASMUSSEN
AND DESERET FEDERAL WHICH PRECLUDE APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Rasmussen next attempts to avoid application of the

statute of frauds by arguing that there are sufficient memoranda
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of Deseret Federal's promise to surrender its space and
Crossroads' promise to lease the space to take the alleged oral
agreement out of the statute of frauds.

The trial court properly

rejected this argument, concluding as a matter of law that the
documents relied upon by Rasmussen do not constitute a sufficient
memorandum of any agreement between the parties.
Under Utah law, written memoranda of an oral agreement,
which are subscribed by the party to be charged, are sufficient
to remove such an agreement from the application of the statute
of frauds if:

(1) the memorandum acknowledges or recognizes that

a contract has been entered into by the parties, and (2) the
memorandum contains all the essential terms and provisions of the
contract.

The documents relied upon by Rasmussen fail to satisfy

these requirements.
A

*

The Documents Fail to Acknowledge or Recognize that
a Contract Had Been Entered Into by the Parties.
This Court has long recognized the general rule

that to constitute a sufficient memorandum, a writing or a group
of writings taken together must contain "an acknowledgement or
recognition that a contract has been entered into by the
parties."

Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242

P.2d 578, 580 (1952).

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts

adopts the same standard.

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts

§ 131(b) & comment f (1979).

In the Birdzell case, the plaintiff

attempted to enforce an oral contract for a lease based on a
letter written by the defendant.

The letter, however, indicated
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that the parties were "negotiating" for a lease and stated the
terms upon which a lease would be available.

The Court concluded

that the letter did not suffice as an adequate memorandum because
it lacked an acknowledgement or recognition that the parties had
reached an agreement.
The facts in this case are strikingly similar to those
in Birdzell.

None of the writings relied upon by Rasmussen

contain an acknowledgement or recognition of any oral agreement.
Instead, the writings state that the parties had been negotiating
a proposal and that any agreement was subject to certain
specified conditions, including the receipt and execution of
final documentation.
Rasmussen specifies four writings which allegedly
constitute a memorandum of an agreement between the parties:

(1)

a letter from Howard J. Swapp to Bruce Barcal dated January 13,
1983f (2) an unsigned agreement concerning remodeling of certain
space to be used by Deseret Federal, (3) a letter from Bruce
Barcal to Bruce Cundick dated March 9, 1983, and (4) the unsigned
lease agreement delivered to Rasmussen by Crossroads.
Appellant's Brief 18-22.

See

The January 13 letter from Howard Swapp

to Bruce Barcal states that Deseret Federal had been "negotiating
a proposal" concerning the subject space.

See Addendum "1".

Additionally, as previously discussed, the letter sets forth four
conditions that needed to be met prior to consummation of any
such proposal.

Finally, the letter grants authority to Bruce

Barcal to act on behalf of Deseret Federal to finalize the
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proposal but provides that such authority would expire on March
15, 1983. Nowhere in that letter is it even implied that a
binding agreement had been reached concerning the subject space.
The March 9 letter from Bruce Barcal to Bruce Cundick
states "please accept this letter, as an expression of intent for
Crossroads Plaza to release Deseret Federal Savings from
approximately 790.5 square feet of their space at Crossroads
Plaza."

See Addendum "2".

The letter also states that Kravco,

Inc., Crossroads1 leasing agent, was preparing leases and lease
surrender forms.

Thus the letter expresses an intent to

consummate the negotiations of the parties but in no way states
or implies that any agreement had already been reached.
The two unsigned agreements relied upon by Rasmussen
cannot be construed to acknowledge or imply that the parties had
reached an agreement and entered into a contract.

Indeed, the

agreements are unsigned and the parties intended the same to
remain unsigned until an agreement was finally reached.
Rasmussen relies on three Utah cases in support of his
argument that sufficient memoranda of the agreement existed in
this case.

In each of those cases, however, the writings relied

upon contained an express acknowledgement that the parties had
reached an agreement.

In Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah

1980), the court concluded that a check and an unsigned deed
constituted sufficient memoranda of an oral agreement to convey a
parcel of land.

The check relied upon stated "one-half payment

on land as agreed - other one-half payment when deed delivered."
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With that language, there was no doubt that the parties were not
merely negotiating for the purchase and sale of the land but had
in fact reached an agreement.
Similarly, in Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah
1979), receipts of payment actually received by the seller of
property were held to be sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds.

The receipts specifically referred to the transaction as

a "sale" and acknowledged receipt of part payment for the
property in question.

The only issue in the case was the

adequacy of the property description.
In Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 Utah (1974),
also relied upon by Rasmussen, the oral contract between the
parties was specifically acknowledged in certain letters. The
parties were partners in a mining venture and a letter from the
defendant to the plaintiff expressly acknowledged the agreement
and stated only a condition that if ore were discovered, that a
one-half interest in the claims would be conveyed to the
plaintiff.
As stated by Professor Corbin,
Letters and other memoranda are not
sufficient to satisfy the statute, even
though they contain explicit references to
each other, unless they amount to an
acknowledgement by the party to be charged
that he has assented to the contract that is
asserted by the other party. If, when
interpreted together, they show no more than
preliminary negotiations suggesting terms to
be later agreed upon, they are insufficient
to establish a contract. This would be
equally true, even if no statute of frauds
existed.
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2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 517 (1950) (emphasis added).
This rule recognizes that there must be a contract between the
parties before such a contract can be enforced.

The rule makes

it possible for parties to negotiate without the fear of
liability for agreements not yet made.

That purpose for the

statute of frauds is well-established and has been expressed by
various courts.

For examplef in Yacobian v. J. D. Carson Co.,

205 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo. App. 1947), the court stated, "parties
having in contemplation a lease contract are and should be
privileged to negotiate and truly discuss the terms and
conditions that each will agree to and neither be bound by their
tentative agreements until they are placed in writing and
signed."

Id.

at 925 (emphasis added).

The undisputed facts show that Rasmussen was well aware
that any agreement with Deseret Federal was predicated upon a
written release of Deseret Federal and a new written lease by
Crossroads to Rasmussen.

No such documents were ever executed.

Rasmussen's reliance on preliminary negotiations that were
contingent on execution of final written agreements are
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of a written memorandum.
B.

The Memoranda Relied Upon Do Not Identify the
Essential Terms of the Alleged Oral Agreement.
This court has consistently recognized that "It

is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied upon to
satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the essential
terms and provisions of the contract."
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Birdzell v. Utah Oil

Refining Co,, 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952); see, e.g.,
McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp, 631 P.2d 851, 854
(Utah 1981).

At a minimum, a contract for a lease in excess of

one year must specify the amount of property to be leased, a
definite and agreed term, and a fixed rental rate.

See, e.g.,

Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1377 (Utah
1976) (invalidating a contract to renew a lease because the
parties had not agreed on a rental rate); Birdzell, 242 P.2d at
580.
In the present case, Rasmussen admits that the parties
discussed a lease of both 790 square feet and 950 square feet.
The term of years for the purported release/re-let agreement was
equally ambiguous —

possibly 10 years, possibly 12. And

according to Rasmussen1s own testimony, rent for a sublease was
discussed as "somewhere in the neighborhood" of $25.00 a foot,
certainly not words of agreement.

The letters relied upon by

Rasmussen as constituting memoranda of the agreement contain no
reference to any terms.

Moreover, the other unexecuted

agreements relied upon by Rasmussen contain terms at variance
with the terms testified to by Rasmussen in his deposition.
Because the documents do not contain an adequate description of
the terms of the alleged oral agreement, the trial court properly
ruled that the statute of frauds is applicable in this case.

-22-

III.

THE ACTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF IN ANTICIPATION OF AN
AGREEMENT FOR A LEASE DO NOT CONSTITUTE PART PERFORMANCE.
Rasmussen further attempts to avoid the application of

the statute of frauds by alleging that the acts taken by him in
anticipation of an agreement to lease the subject space
constitute part performance.

Rasmussen argues that factual

issues remain concerning whether specific performance is
available in this case based on the alleged part performance.

As

will be demonstrated, however, the acts taken by Rasmussen cannot
legally constitute sufficient part performance to avoid the
statute.
In McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp., 631
P.2d 851 (Utah 1981)f this Court recognized that the doctrine of
part performance is generally available only in two specific
circumstances:

(1) "where valuable improvements have been made

to property by a plaintiff who has taken possession," or (2)
"where the contract terms have been fully performed by the party
seeking enforcement of a clear and definite oral contract."
at 853.

Id.

In these two instances, "failure to enforce the oral

contract would work a fraud on the person who performed pursuant
to the terms of the agreement."

JTd.

In this case, Rasmussen's

acts were not part performance at all, but were merely
preparatory acts taken with the hope that the transaction would
be consummated.
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A.

Rasmussen Did Not Enter Into Possession of the

Subject Space or Make Valuable Improvements.
The first category of cases in which this Court
has recognized the applicability of the doctrine of part
performance involves cases where valuable improvements have been
made and the plaintiff has taken possession of the property.
See , e.g. , Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah 1980).

In such cases,

the oral contract must be clear and definite and established by
clear and definite testimony:
In addition, part performance requires that
(1) any improvements made on the property
must be substantial and valuable; (2)
valuable consideration must be given; (3)
possession must be actual and open; and (4)
the acts of part performance must be
exclusively referable to the contract.
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982); see Coleman v.
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981).

These requirements

reflect the general rule that, "Acts . . . which are merely
preliminary, preparatory, or ancillary to the contract to be
enforced, are not sufficient as part performance."

73 Am. Jur.

2d Statute of Frauds § 409, at 36 (1976).
An analysis of the alleged acts of part performance in
this case reveals that none of the foregoing requirements have
been satisfied and that the acts were merely preparatory.
Rasmussen alleges that he obtained a small business
administration loan to expand his business, he prepared plans and
specifications to remodel the subject space and to remodel
certain space owned by Deseret Federal at a separate location,
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and paid certain disputed construction costs to Crossroads which
were unrelated to the subject space.

Rasmussen did not take

possession of the subject space or make any improvements thereon,
much less improvements that are "substantial and valuable."
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that Rasmussen
paid any valuable consideration to Deseret Federal.

Rasmussen

implies that somehow the payment of disputed construction costs
to Crossroads might satisfy the consideration requirement.
However, that sum was paid to Crossroads, not to Deseret Federal.
The preliminary acts taken by Rasmussen are not
exclusively referable to an alleged contract that the parties had
already made.

See Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983).

The loan obtained by Rasmussen could have been used for expansion
of his business into any space or his existing space. Moreover,
prudent parties frequently prepare plans, secure financing, or
make other arrangements in preparation for an agreement to be
consummated.

The payment of disputed construction costs to

Crossroads is not exclusively referable to the alleged oral
contract.

Crossroads and Rasmussen certainly could have resolved

a dispute about construction costs unrelated to the subject space
without regard to any oral agreement that the subject space would
be leased to Rasmussen.
The analysis and result in Pacific Cascade Corp. v.
Nimmer, 25 Wash. App. 552, 608 P.2d 266 (1980), should control in
this case.

In Nimmer, an owner of land sent a letter to a

prospective lessee expressing an intent to lease a portion of the
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landf setting forth the general terms for the lease and stating
that the terms remained subject to appropriate documentation.
The letter was accompanied by a 58 page draft of the lease. In
anticipation that the lease would be finalized, the prospective
lessee conducted a survey and soil test of the property, but did
not take possession of any part of the property or make any
improvements thereon or tender the payment of any rentals.
at 670.

Id.

The court held that the preliminary acts of obtaining a

survey and soil test did not constitute part performance.
This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the doctrine
of part performance is not available in cases, such as the
instant case, involving the purchase, sale, or lease of land
where the party does not take possession of the land, does not
make any payments, and does not make any valuable improvements.
See, e.g. , Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), McDonald
v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981),
Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975).
Because Rasmussen did none of the foregoing acts, part
performance is unavailable under Utah law.
In sum, the acts relied upon by Rasmussen were
preparatory or ancillary to the alleged agreement and were merely
based on Rasmussen1s expectation that the transaction would be
consummated.

-26-

B.

Rasmussen Has Not Fully Performed the Alleged Oral
Agreement,
The second category of cases in which this court

has applied the doctrine of part performance includes cases where
a clear and definite oral contract has been fully performed.

See

McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp., 631 P.2d 851, 853
(Utah 1981).

For example, in Randall v. Tracy Collins Bank &

Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956), an
elderly aunt promised to devise property to her nephew if her
nephew took care of her.

The nephew fully performed the contract

by changing his residence from Ogden to Provo, taking care of his
aunt, and managing her affairs.

Because the nephew had fully

performed the contract, the Court concluded that equity required
that the contract be specifically enforced.
Another case in this category is Martin v. Scholl, 678
P.2d 274 (Utah 1983), the only case relied upon by Rasmussen on
this issue.

In Martin, a ranch laborer sought to enforce an oral

agreement by a ranch owner to convey certain real property.

The

laborer fully performed by working long, hard hours for the owner
and declining other and better offers of employment.

Those acts

may have been sufficient, except the Court concluded that the
acts were not exclusively referable to the contract.
Consequently, the Court held the agreement void under the statute
of frauds.
The facts in this case are not even remotely similar to
the facts in Randall or Martin.

In this case, Rasmussen at best
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performed various preparatory acts in anticipation that the
transaction would be finalized and the lease documents signed.
Rasmussen did not make lease payments, complete the remodeling of
space for Deseret Federal, remodel the subject space, or
otherwise perform the alleged agreement.

Because Rasmussen has

not fully performed the alleged agreement, the part performance
argument must fail as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Rasmussen's disappointment from negotiations that did
not come to fruition cannot sustain this action.

Deseret

Federal's expression of a willingness to release its leasehold
interest in space at Crossroads Mall was not a legally binding
promise.

Even if it were construed as a promise, the terms of

the promise were expressly conditioned upon execution of final
written documentation and upon other events that never took
place.
As Judge Sawaya properly concluded, the alleged oral
agreement is void under the Utah statute of frauds.

The doctrine

of promissory estoppel is unavailable in this case for the simple
reason that no agreement was ever made upon which reliance could
be placed.

Moreover, there is no evidence of an intent by

Deseret Federal to abandon its right to assert the statute of
frauds.

The documents expressly reaffirmed that Deseret Federal

fully intended to rely upon the protection of the statute.
Finally, there are no sufficient memoranda of the alleged oral
agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds and the preparatory
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acts taken by Rasmussen do not constitute part performance
sufficient to bar the statute's application.
The facts in the record fully support the district
court's conclusion that summary judgment is proper in this case.
Deseret Federal therefore respectfully requests this Court to
affirm the summary judgment entered in its favor and dismiss this
appeal.
DATED this ^f^a

ay of October, 1985.
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR^CROCKETT

Ranald G. Russell, Esq.
Attorneys for Respondent
Deseret Federal Savings
& Loan Association
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ADDENDUM 1

'EDKK*1' ^-v VINCS AND LOAN

*
I

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

ASSOCIATION
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1983

Barcal
s Plaza
C i t y /

/--"ociatei
U'ah

S-U44

jfhSarcal:

.space o n t / i e main, p l a z a l e v e l .
*-o orovJ^ e you with the authority necessary to manage this
!
l "oeserct Federal grants permission to your office to act
"agent under the following conditions;
The soacc

is

available only to Vaughn Rasmussen.

D^seret Federal Savings is unconditionally released from
a U tenar.r- responsibility for the subject space.
J. D- S o~^ federal savings will not pay any fees, charges or
f o r £n
ci'mmissi^5 t o * n Y Party
y r e £ S O n relative to tne
subject t-ransactior..
{. D^seret ?--dera^ and Vaughn Rasmussen additional agreements
*re full/ executed.
:r a-vy reason' Vaughn Rasmussen should choose to discontinue
?'ans"to occu-py the subject space, Deseret Federal Savings is
ia
tere^ted iro ^ n y further proposals.
'''thority gra-nted herein shall expire March 15, 1983.
.iolv.
^t-.c'S

—7Z. <->-<•-

*°f Vice Prer. •_ c e n t

ESiJ-C
M'.Z-

/ i j j j j n i N j j u r i z.

^$ $ &

u
arch 9, 1983

r. Bruce Cundick
eseret Federal Savings & Loan
D South Main
alt Lake City, Utah 8*144

E:

Partial Surrender of Premises

ear Mr. Cundick:
lease accept this letter, as an expression of intent
Dr Crossroads Plaza to release Deseret Federal Savings
rote approximately 790.5 square feet of their space
t Crossroads Plaza. The purpose of this surrender will
> solely used for Mr. Vaughn Rasmussen and the estabLshment of an additional shoe store at Crossroads Plaza.
: is understood that Mr. Rasmussen will absorb all ex*nses regarding the demising and reconstruction of the
remises.
ravco, Inc. is presently preparing leases and lease
jrrender forms for the square footage discussed. You
lould be receiving the lease surrender form in approximately five (5) business days.
: you have any questions please do not hesitate to
>ntact/ay office.

ucef Barca

IvCO, INC.*

Mr. Howard Swapp
Mr. Vaughn Rasmussen
KRAVCO, Lease File
Deseret Federal Lease File
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